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    <title>Ethics and Normativity</title>
    <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/</link>
    <description>Ethics and Normativity</description>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0330</pubDate>
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      <title>Avicenna’s Theory of Practical Reason In al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt (Remarks and Admonitions)  and Its Commentaries</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200153.html</link>
      <description>Understanding morality, first and foremost, requires an understanding of the foundation from which morality arises, which is &amp;amp;ldquo;reason&amp;amp;rdquo; or &amp;amp;ldquo;intellect.&amp;amp;rdquo; By &amp;amp;ldquo;reason,&amp;amp;rdquo; we do not mean specific or acquired reason, but the nature of reason. And by the &amp;amp;ldquo;nature of reason,&amp;amp;rdquo; we refer to what serves as the foundation of morality, the foundation of contingent knowledge, the foundation of all human philosophies, and the foundation of metaphysics. Thus, an understanding of reason is inevitable and required for an understanding of morality, of any discipline, and finally, of metaphysics. This is why understanding reason precedes understanding all disciplines, including ethics. Earlier scientists, philosophers, and scholars were well aware of this fact, and before delving into definitions of disciplines, philosophy, as well as scholarly and ethical issues, they sought to understand &amp;amp;ldquo;reason&amp;amp;rdquo; and elucidate its various degrees.</description>
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      <title>Equal Standing and Practical Wisdom</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200154.html</link>
      <description>I overview Bagnoli&amp;amp;rsquo;s position on practical wisdom and compare it to a few sample alternative accounts, with an emphasis on how equal standing functions in the account she offers. First, since Bagnoli&amp;amp;rsquo;s account is Kantian, we examine how it avoids the kinds of objections to Kantian theories of practical wisdom raised in the Hegelian tradition. Second, Bagnoli contrasts her view with the exemplarist model developed by Linda Zagzebski. I will offer criticisms of both Bagnoli&amp;amp;rsquo;s account and Zagzebski&amp;amp;rsquo;s and make a few suggestions for how practical wisdom could be understood in a manner that draws on the tradition of Islamic thought, while recognizing the problems and penetrating insights found in the works of Carla Bagnoli and the traditions of thought with she engages.</description>
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      <title>The Purest Human Will</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200155.html</link>
      <description>Certain statements by renowned philosophers, who are everlasting in human intellectual history, require explanations to be fully understood. These explanations are dependent on various principles within the relevant philosophy, whose combination has given rise to these statements. Without considering and grasping these principles, deciphering these statements is impossible. These statements contain substantial content and possess a beauty and appeal that captivate readers from all levels of intellectual knowledge. One example of such a distinguished scholar in intellectual disciplines and philosophy is Mullā Ṣadrā. Some of his statements showcase his elevated status in both religious studies and purely intellectual disciplines. The phrase "rational will" originates from a statement he made in the introduction of his magnum opus al-Asfār. This article explores some of the implications of this phrase and how its elaboration in terms of his principles has significant consequences for practical wisdom and ethics.</description>
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      <title>Ethics of Chivalry according to Henry Corbin</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200156.html</link>
      <description>Futuwwa (spiritual chivalry) is a frequently used key term in Corbin's writings on Iranian Islam. It is no accident that the concluding, the seventh book his Iranian Islam, is titled "The Twelfth Imam and Futuwwa." Corbin's exploration of Iranian Islam can be classified into seven key themes: methodology, epistemology, theology, cosmology, anthropology, ontology, and axiology. I find it worthy to conduct a comprehensive study about his idea, in which these dimensions are distinguished as much as possible and then their relationships with one another are explained. The limited scope of this writing does not allow such a discussion, but let me point out that, in fact, as far as the axiological aspect of Corbin&amp;amp;rsquo;s research on Iranian Islam is concerned, this issue can be investigated in terms of &amp;amp;ldquo;Futuwwa&amp;amp;rdquo; (spiritual chivalry), or more precisely speaking, in terms of the ethics of futuwwa. To comprehend the ethics of futuwwa, it is important to elucidate its relationship with other theories pertaining to the human moral obligations and character, particularly those regarding virtue ethics.</description>
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      <title>Ethical Aspects in Different Understandings of Justice</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200157.html</link>
      <description>There are controversies, particularly in the contemporary era, regarding the status of social justice as a value and virtue. Over the course of history, different perspectives on justice have emerged. This article aims to examine the position of the ethical aspect of justice within these various interpretations and identify which perspectives accept it as a social value and social ethic. It also discusses explanations of these different conceptions regarding the ethical aspect of justice.</description>
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      <title>Ṛta and Aša: The Metaphysical Foundation of Happiness in Classical Hindu-Iranian Texts (Rigveda and Gatha)</title>
      <link>https://ean.urd.ac.ir/article_200158.html</link>
      <description>The belief in good and evil, and the consequences of each, is almost universally shared or innately held by all humans, a belief that may be as old as humanity itself. However, what has been subject to debate since antiquity is the criterion or measure of good and evil. This article explores one of the earliest responses to this question: that which is consonant with the cosmic order is good, and that which is not is evil. This response presupposes a belief in a cosmic order or system, known by various terms across different cultures. In ancient Hindu and Iranian texts such as the Vedas and the Gathas of the Avesta, this principle is referred to with terms such as ṛta, arta, and a&amp;amp;scaron;a. In these traditions, this principle not only organizes all cosmic events, both large and small, but also serves as the criterion for determining the rightness and wrongness of individual behaviors, social and political systems, and devotional practices. It even provides the framework for divine acts and commands. While the Hindu ṛta shares common roots with the Iranian arta or a&amp;amp;scaron;a, they did not undergo the same semantic developments over history. This article examines the semantic scope and various instances of these terms, as well as their transformations from impersonality to personification and sanctification, their connection to divinity and holy texts, and the differences they experienced throughout their historical development.</description>
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